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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARRANTLESS DOORWAY ARRESTS
Jack E. Call*
Officer Jackson possesses probable cause to arrest Kendall for arson. One
evening, he goes to Kendall's home in uniform without a warrant to arrest
Kendall. In response to Jackson's knock on the door of his house, Kendall opens
the front door. A screen door continues to separate Jackson and Kendall.
Jackson indicates to Kendall that he is there to arrest him for arson and asks if he
may come in. Kendall remains exactly where he is and says nothing in response
to Jackson's request. Jackson asks again if he may come in, and again Kendall
does not reply.
Grabbing the handle to the screen door and finding it unlocked, Jackson opens
the screen door, reaches through the doorway, grabs Kendall by his necktie, and
pulls him through the doorway and onto the front porch. Jackson handcuffs
Kendall and conducts a search of Kendall, which turns up a plastic bag of
cocaine in Kendall's inside coat pocket. The cocaine, discovered as part of a
search incident to Kendall's arrest, is admissible as evidence against Kendall only
if the arrest is valid. This Article examines the constitutionality of such warrant-
less doorway arrests.
I. SUPREME COURT CASES
In United States v. Watson,1 the United States Supreme Court held that law
enforcement officers may make warrantless public arrests for felonies. The
Court noted that this was the rule in England at the time the Fourth Amendment
was written by the first Congress in 1789. Since the Fourth Amendment did not
specifically change this rule, the Court concluded that the drafters of the amend-
ment did not intend for the amendment to change the rule.
In addition, the Court noted that the overwhelming practice in this country for
nearly two hundred years was to make felony arrests without a warrant.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
public warrantless felony arrests.
Four years after deciding Watson, the Court dealt with a case involving the
warrantless entry of a home to make a felony arrest in Payton v. New York.2 The
Court noted that arrests made in the home are a special case because "physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed."3 While this sentiment arose largely in the context of
searches, the Court saw no reason to make a distinction between searches and
arrests since both "intrusions share this fundamental characteristic: the breach of
*Ph.D. in political science, University of Georgia, 1985; J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary, 1974. The author is currently a Professor of Criminal Justice at Radford University in
Radford, Virginia.
1. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
2. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
3. Id. at 585 (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
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the entrance to an individual's home."' Consequently, the Court concluded that
"the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant."5
One other Supreme Court case relating to the validity of warrantless doorway
arrests is United States v. Santana.6 In that case, the police had probable cause to
arrest Santana, but had no arrest or search warrant. When they arrived, Santana
was standing in the open doorway of her house. When she saw the officers
arrive, she retreated into her house. The Court concluded that Santana was in a
public place when the police arrived and could have been arrested there without
a warrant. When she elected to retreat into the house, the officers were justified
in pursuing her without a warrant because they were in "hot pursuit."
At first glance, it might appear that Santana resolved the issue of the constitu-
tionality of warrantless doorway arrests. However, the Court made it clear in that
case that when the police first observed Santana, she was straddling the doorway
with one foot inside the home and one foot outside. Consequently, if the police
had been able to arrest her at that precise moment, they could have done so pre-
sumably without any portion of their bodies crossing the threshold of the home.7
Thus, neither Santana nor any other Supreme Court case directly addresses the
issue presented by the hypothetical case stated at the beginning of this Article.
II. LOWER COURT CASES
Research for cases dealing with the issue of the constitutionality of warrantless
doorway arrests identified thirty-eight cases in twenty-two federal and state juris-
dictions.' The jurisdictions were split, with twelve jurisdictions ruling in favor of
defendants on this issue and ten jurisdictions ruling in favor of the government.9
Interestingly, the United States Courts of Appeals, generally considered the most
important courts in our judicial system after the Supreme Court, were evenly
split. Three jurisdictions have ruled against,1" and three in favor of the constitu-
tionality of warrantless doorway arrests."
A substantial number of these cases dealt with this constitutional issue in a
rather perfunctory manner. In these cases, the court typically identified the
issue, made a brief reference to a prior case dealing with the same issue, and then
announced its ruling. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court devoted con-
4. Id. at 589.
5. Id. at 590.
6. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
7. In this paper, "threshold" shall be used to refer to the imaginary plane that runs through the doorway of a
home, bordered by the frame of the front door.
8. See Table of Cases infra.
9. See Table infra.
10. U.S. v. Berkowitz, 927 F2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. McCraw, 920 E2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990); Duncan
v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1989).
11. McKinnon v. Carr, 103 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Vaneaton, 49 E3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. v.
Carrion, 809 F2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Whitten, 706 E2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Mason, 661 F2d
45 (5th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Johnson, 626 E2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980).
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siderable attention to whether an arresting officer possessed probable cause to
arrest the defendant. Concluding that he did, the court disposed of the warrant-
less doorway arrest issue in just three sentences: "Absent exigent circumstances,
mere probable cause is insufficient to permit an arresting officer to enter the sus-
pect's home without a warrant. [citing Payton]. However, at the time of her
arrest, Appellant was standing in the doorway of her home, a public place where
she had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, she was subject to a valid
warrantless arrest. [citing Santana]."'2
Other courts in this group of cases managed to devote more space in their
opinions to the issue of warrantless arrests, but still resolved it with virtually no
analysis. Typically, these courts relied on Santana as the controlling case.
However, their opinions did not address the issue of whether Santana was distin-
guishable on the basis that the defendant had one foot outside the home when the
police wanted to arrest her, whereas in the cases before the courts, the defendant
was completely behind the threshold of the home when arrested.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Santana to uphold a warrantless
search case in United States v. Mason.3 The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that Vale v. Louisiana4 was controlling. In Vale, the court held that the
police could not use an arrest to create exigent circumstances to justify a war-
rantless search. 5 It disposed of the case by concluding that "Vale is inapposite;
Santana controls. The agents did not seek to create exigent circumstances either
for the warrantless arrest or the warrantless search. Mason was permissibly arrest-
ed at the front door."'6 Even though Vale was a warrantless search case, not a war-
rantless arrest case, the court limited its analysis to Vale and Santana and failed
even to mention Payton, presumably because the defendant had not cited it.
Another large group of cases gave some attention to the warrantless doorway
arrest issue by discussing Payton, Santana, and several lower court cases. 7
However, these courts decided the issue without any careful consideration of the
policy issues behind the Court's holding in Payton. It is clear that Payton's pri-
mary concern is with protection of the privacy of the home." Nevertheless, the
overwhelming majority of the cases failed to address how their rulings would
impact this important privacy interest.
Some of these cases make reference to the arrestee's expectation of privacy in
the home, but fail to discuss whether their rulings would encourage the police to
respect that interest. For example, in United States v. Ostin,9 the court conclud-
ed that although the defendant's arrest had occurred in the doorway of a motel
room, the protections of the Fourth Amendment still applied because "a motel
12. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Ky. 1998).
13. 661 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981).
14. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
15. Vale, 399 U.S. at 33-35.
16. Mason, 661 E2d at 47.
17. See U.S. v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Herrold, 772 F Supp. 1483 (M.D. Pa. 1991);
Illinois v. Schreiber, 432 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill. Ct. App. 1982).
18. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
19. 858 E Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
room is a place where the occupant has a strong and legitimate expectation of
privacy."2 The court discussed Payton, Santana, and several lower court cases
that were not directly relevant to the doorway arrest issue.21
The Ostin court then concluded that the warrantless arrest was constitutional
because the defendant opened the door of his home in response to the police offi-
cer's knock, thereby "expos[ing] himself to public view of anyone who happened
to be in the area, thus no longer being in an area where he had any expectation of
privacy."22 The court discussed several cases that did not apply to the situation
before it. For analytical purposes, the result was the same as if the court had
simply relied on Santana as establishing that the doorway was a public place.23
III. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES OF THE LOWER COURT CASES
Analytically, the lower court cases take two basic approaches to the warrantless
doorway arrest issue. The first approach permits warrantless arrests at the door-
way of a person's home even if the person was summoned to the door by the
police and even if the person was standing behind the threshold at the time of the
arrest.24
One well-reasoned case which took this approach is People v. Graves.2" In that
case, the defendant had just received a call from a friend who indicated that he
was coming over to the defendant's house.2" When the police knocked on the
front door, the defendant answered, expecting to see his friend.27 Instead, after a
short conversation with the two officers, the defendant was arrested.28
The court distinguished this case from Santana in two ways. In Santana, the
defendant was in the doorway when the police approached her home; in Graves,
the defendant came to the doorway in response to a knock by the police and was
still standing behind the threshold when he was arrested. The court found that
neither of these differences was significant.
The fact that the defendant came to the doorway without knowing that police
officers were there ... should not negate the voluntariness of that action of the
defendant. A major aspect of the Santana opinion is that a person who places
himself in an open doorway to his home places himself in a public place and
gives up the privacy that he would have had in the sanctuary of the home. The
opinion makes no mention of any requirement that the person know who else
might be in that public place. The Santana defendant had no knowledge of the
officers' approach as she went to her doorway and made an ineffective retreat
once she found they were seeking her. The opinions in Patton and Schreiber
20. Id. at 1078 (citing United States v. Winsor, 816 E2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987)).
21. Id. at 1077-81.
22. Id. at 1080.
23. Id. at 1077-81.
24. See, infra, note 25.
25. 482 N.E.2d 223 (111. App. Ct. 1985).
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[two earlier Illinois cases dealing with warrantless doorway arrests] make no
mention of the defendant in either of those cases knowing that police were at the
door when they went to the doorway.29
Thus, the court borrowed the idea from Santana that when a person places her-
self in a position where she can be seen by the public, she has relinquished the
privacy that Payton tries to protect. Of course, the Santana court is far from
clear as to whether it would have viewed the situation differently if the defendant
had remained inside the home and had come to the door in response to a knock
from the police. Nevertheless, courts permitting warrantless doorway arrests
commonly take this view of Santana.
Most of the cases upholding warrantless doorway arrests involved a situation
such as in Graves. In Graves, the defendant came to the front door not knowing
that it was the police knocking on the door, or not having been coerced by the
police into coming to the door, or deceived as to who would be at the door.
30
Most of these cases also speak of the defendant having come to the door volun-
tarily, thereby creating a presumption that the warrantless arrest would be invalid
if the police had coerced the defendant.
This presumption was borne out in United States v. Morgan.1 In that case, the
police wanted to arrest Morgan at his mother's home on a firearms charge. They
were warned by an informant that Morgan was overheard saying that he would
shoot any law enforcement officer who tried to arrest him.' Consequently, the
police surrounded the house of Morgan's mother, trained several spotlights on
the home, and used bullhorns to inform Morgan that he should come out of the
house peacefully because the house was surrounded by police 4.3 The court found
unconstitutional the warrantless arrest that occurred just outside the home.3 1 In
response to the government's argument that the Payton rule was not violated
because Morgan was not arrested inside his mother's home, the court indicated
that:
"it cannot be said that [Morgan] voluntarily exposed himself to a warrantless
arrest" by appearing at the door 6 On the contrary, Morgan appeared at the door
only because of the coercive police behavior taking place outside of the house ....
Viewed in these terms, the arrest of Morgan occurred while he was present
inside a private home. Although there was no direct police entry into the
Morgan home prior to Morgan's arrest, the constructive entry accomplished the
same thing, namely, the arrest of Morgan. Thus, the warrantless arrest of
Morgan, as he stood within the door of a private home, after emerging in
29. Id. at 225.
30. Id. at 223.
31. 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984).
32. Id. at 1160.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1161.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 E2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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response to coercive police conduct, violated Morgan's fourth amendment
rights. A contrary rule would undermine the constitutional precepts emphasized
in Payton. 7
Similarly, it has been found that the same result will occur if the police use
deception to secure the defendant's presence at the front door. In United States v.
Johnson,38 the police knocked on Johnson's front door and used fictitious names
to identify themselves.39 The court found that the warrantless arrest that
occurred when Johnson appeared in the doorway was a violation of the Payton
rule because
it cannot be said that Johnson voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest
by opening his door to agents who misrepresented their identities. In light of
the strong language by the Court in Payton emphasizing the special protection
the Constitution affords to individuals within their homes, we find that the war-
rantless arrest of Johnson, while he stood within his home, after having opened
the door in response to false identification by the agents, constituted a violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights.4
Thus, these cases collectively create an approach to the constitutionality of
warrantless doorway arrests. This approach holds that such arrests are permissi-
ble even when the defendant came to the door in response to a police knock and
even when the defendant was standing behind the threshold. The only exception
to this approach would be where the defendant's appearance at the door was
secured through the use of force or deception on the part of the police.
The second basic approach taken by lower court cases does not permit warrant-
less doorway arrests when the defendant is still standing behind the threshold
unless the defendant acquiesces to the arrest. Perhaps the leading case taking
this approach is United States v. Berkowitz. 1 In that case, IRS agents and the
defendant gave conflicting testimony as to whether the agents had arrested the
defendant before or after they entered his home.42 The court indicated that if the
IRS version was accurate, the warrantless arrest of Berkowitz would be constitu-
tional because he had acquiesced in the arrest.43 In its insistence that acquies-
cence by the defendant was necessary to make the warrantless arrest valid, the
court indicated that:
37. Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1166.
38. Johnson, 626 E2d 753.
39. Id. at 755.
40. Id. at 757.
41. 927 E2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991).
42. Id. at 1380.
43. The court is not perfectly clear as to how Berkowitz acquiesced under the government's version of the
facts. However, the court states the government's claim as being that "the IRS agents asserted their authority to
arrest before entering Berkowitz's home, and ... Berkowitz did not resist their authority." Id. at 1385.
Although the court purports to create a stringent rule concerning warrantless doorway arrests by requiring
acquiescence on the part of the defendant, its apparent willingness to infer acquiescence from a failure to resist
police authority is somewhat distressing.
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[a]s the Court noted in Payton, there is no place where a person's expectation of
privacy is greater than in his own home .... A person does not abandon this pri-
vacy interest in his home by opening his door from within to answer a knock.
Answering a knock at the door is not an invitation to come in the house. We
think society would recognize a person's right to choose to close his door on and
exclude people he does not want within his home. This right to exclude is one of
the most-if not the most-important components of a person's privacy expec-
tation in his home."
Another judge, dissenting in the court's holding in State v. Santiago,4" put it
this way:
We answer our doorbells under a variety of circumstances, ranging from the sit-
uation where we expect a visit by family or friends, to the unexpected and
unwanted attempted intrusion of the door-to-door solicitor. We open the door in
a variety of ways and to a variety of degrees, ranging from the opening wide in
order to welcome the visiting friend, to the wary and narrow opening in order to
ward off politely but firmly the unwelcome stranger. When we open the door,
we may stand just inside the threshold or may place ourselves squarely thereon.
In all of these situations, however, we do not abandon our right to close the door
and exclude the person at the door simply because we have opened it and are
standing there briefly. By opening the door in response to a ring or knock, and
standing there briefly so that our feet are on the threshold rather than just inside
it, we do not abandon our heightened expectation of privacy in our homes and
place ourselves in a public place.46
Thus, under this second approach to the issue of warrantless doorway arrests,
if police go to a person's home to make an arrest without a warrant, they take a
greater risk of being unable to complete the arrest than they do under the first
approach. Under the first approach, the police may still arrest even the resistant
arrestee without a warrant so long as that person does not flee inside the home.
Under the second approach, however, resistance would be construed as a failure
to acquiesce, and the arrest under such circumstances would be invalid.
IV AN EVALUATION
It may seem to some readers that all this discussion about whether warrantless
doorway arrests are constitutional is a lot of wasted energy. After all, both
approaches discussed above agree that the police may arrest, without a warrant,
persons standing just outside the doorway to their homes. Additionally, under
both approaches, the police may not arrest, without a warrant, persons inside
their homes at the time of the arrest (unless, of course, the police have been
given consent to enter or exigent circumstances exist). Thus, the disagreement
really revolves around less than five feet of geography.
44. Id. at 1387.
45. 619A.2d 1132 (Conn. 1993).
46. Id. at 1142-43.
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In the law, it is always the resolution of "close cases" or cases "at the margins"
that help to better focus one's vision of the real purposes behind the law. The
issue under discussion here is no different. The key to sorting out the warrant-
less doorway arrest cases is unquestionably a clear vision of the purpose behind
the Payton rule. It certainly is no mystery that this purpose is to protect the pri-
vacy of the home.
The real mystery is that so few of the cases dealing with the warrantless door-
way arrest issue truly come to grips with Payton's purpose. Many of the lower
court cases never mention the importance of the privacy interest, and, as we have
seen, many that do mention it do so in such an off-hand, superficial manner, that
they might just as well have ignored it.
How should the courts deal with this issue? Since the clear interest at stake
here is a desire to protect the privacy of the home, it is that desire that should be
the starting point of the analysis. How does Payton protect that interest? Payton,
of course, does not prohibit arrests in the home; it only requires that they be car-
ried out with an arrest warrant. Presumably, the requirement that the police
obtain an arrest warrant serves two purposes: 1) it ensures that the determination
made by the police that they have probable cause to arrest will be double-
checked by a neutral and detached magistrate before the privacy of the home has
been invaded by the police; and 2) it provides the residents of the home greater
confidence that, in fact, the officer has authority to enter the home. 7
To ensure that both of these purposes are served, the cases should maximize
the incentive for the police to arrest at a home with a warrant, without unreason-
ably hampering the police in their crime control efforts. When the rule is that the
police may arrest even a resistant person in the doorway of his home without a
warrant, so long as the person does not retreat into the home, and so long as the
police do not use deception or force to get the person to answer his door, the
police are not provided sufficient incentive to seek an arrest warrant first. The
police know that: 1) they will probably not need to use force or deception to get
the person they want to arrest to answer his door; and 2) once the person answers
the door, he is not likely to run back into the home.
On the other hand, if the rule is that the police will not be able to effectuate the
arrest without a warrant unless the person they want to arrest answers the door
and acquiesces in the arrest, the police have a greater incentive to obtain an
arrest warrant first. First, they know that someone other than the person they
want to arrest may answer the door and refuse either to let them in or to tell them
whether the putative arrestee is in the home (a risk that the police run even under
the more lenient approach taken by some courts). Second, while few putative
arrestees will retreat into the home when confronted by the arresting officer, a
substantially greater number will refuse to go quietly.
Even this stricter approach taken by some courts fails to provide the police suf-
ficient incentive to seek an arrest warrant. Consequently, the courts should add
47. Payton v. NewYork, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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an additional requirement. The police should also be required to inform the per-
son they want to arrest that the law does not require the person to go along and
that the officer can be forced to obtain an arrest warrant first.
One response to this requirement might be that it would unreasonably hamper
the police, because it is difficult to imagine many putative arrestees who would
agree to go along with the police after being told that they do not have to go
along. However, it is difficult to see why this would unduly hamper the police.
In all the warrantless doorway arrest cases cited in this Article, the police had
time to obtain a warrant before going to the defendant's home to arrest him.
Under the Payton rule, if exigent circumstances exist, an arrest warrant is not
needed. Exigent circumstances exist when the police do not have time to get a
warrant. Thus, the requirement advocated in this Article should not hamper the
police at all. Instead, the requirement has the effect of clarifying the Payton rule
by making it clear that the police need an arrest warrant in order to confidently
arrest a person at his home. Such an approach provides the police with a very
strong incentive to obtain an arrest warrant in order to arrest a person at his
home.
V ADDITIONAL POLICE INCENTIVES
Before concluding this discussion, it is worth mentioning that there are at least
two additional incentives for police departments to establish an internal rule that
arrests at homes must always be carried out with an arrest warrant, absent exi-
gent circumstances. The first reason relates to community relations. A police
department would be wise to educate the public about the legal leeway the police
have to make some arrests at the arrestee's home without a warrant. The police
department should then explain that it recognizes the importance of the privacy
that its citizens have in their homes. Based on those interests, the police depart-
ment has established a rule that its officers must obtain an arrest warrant in all
cases where the officer intends to make an arrest at a home, even though the law
does not require the police to go this far. This has the benefit of demonstrating
to the public that the department takes the privacy of citizens so seriously that it
is willing to impose on itself a rule that the law does not require.
The second reason for a police department to require its officers to obtain an
arrest warrant in all cases of non-exigent arrests made at a home is even more
practical. In 1984, in the case of United States v. Leon," the Supreme Court held
that if the police properly execute a search warrant, and it is later determined that
the magistrate lacked probable cause to issue the warrant, any evidence seized in
the execution of the warrant can be used against the defendant at trial. 9 In
effect, this case creates a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when the
police searched with a defective warrant.
This limited good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply when
the police search without a warrant. In other words, if the police conduct a war-
48. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
49. Id. at 922-26.
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rantless search based on exigent circumstances, there must be probable cause to
think contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. If a judge at a suppres-
sion hearing later rules that the police lacked probable cause to search, the fruits
of the search will be inadmissible at the defendant's trial.
Even though the Supreme Court has yet to apply the Leon rule to cases involv-
ing arrests rather than searches, the rationale used by the Court in Leon is equally
applicable to arrest cases. Therefore, it seems quite likely that the limited good
faith exception for searches conducted with a defective warrant would be extend-
ed to arrests made with a defective warrant as well. As a result, if an officer
makes a warrantless arrest in the doorway of a home without violating the
Payton rule, conducts a search incident to the arrest, and finds evidence of a
crime, a judge may conclude that the officer lacked probable cause to make the
arrest and thus suppress the evidence. If the arrest had been made with a war-
rant, the Leon rule would allow the evidence to be used at trial in spite of the
absence of probable cause to arrest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The efforts of lower courts to resolve the issue of whether the police may make
warrantless doorway arrests have resulted in inconsistent approaches. Some
courts permit the police to make such arrests, so long as they do not use coercion
or deception in bringing the arrested person to the doorway. Other courts disal-
low such warrantless arrests unless the arrestee acquiesces in the arrest.
This Article has argued that the latter approach is the better of the two.
However, the latter approach does not go far enough in protecting the important
interest in the privacy of the home. The courts should go further and require the
police to inform persons who are about to be arrested in the doorway of their
homes that they have the right to require the police to obtain a warrant to carry
out the arrest. The effect of such a rule would be to virtually require the police to
have a warrant to make doorway arrests. Even in the absence of such a judicial-
ly-imposed requirement, police departments would be well-advised, for public
relations purposes, to impose the rule on themselves.
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TABLE
POSITIONS ON WARRANTLESS DOORWAY ARREST ISSUE, BY JURISDICTION
Jurisdictions finding the arrest unconstitutional
Federal jurisdictions:
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Middle District of Tennessee
State jurisdictions:






Maryland Court of Special Appeals
Jurisdictions upholding the constitutionality of warrantless doorway arrests
Federal jurisdictions:
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals






Illinois Court of Appeals
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division
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TABLE OF CASES INVOLVING WARRANTLESS DOORWAY ARRESTS
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)(holding seizure in home illegal)
U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)(holding evidence admissible when warrant
found invalid)
U.S. v. Herrold, 772 F. Supp. 1483 (M.D. Pa. 1991)(finding arrest illegal)
U.S. v. McCool, 526 F Supp. 1206 (M.D. Tenn. 198 1)(finding arrest legal)
U.S. v. Ostin, 858 E Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wash. 1994)(finding arrest legal in hotel)
U.S. v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990)(finding arrest illegal in hotel room)
U.S. v. Mason, 661 F2d 45 (5th Cir. 1981)(finding arrest legal)
U.S. v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987)(finding search legal)
U.S. v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984)(finding no exigent circumstances)
U.S. v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991)(remanding for legality issue)
Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1989)(denying summary judgement)
U.S. v. Johnson, 626 F2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980)(finding arrest illegal
through misidentification of police at door)
U.S. v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995)(finding arrest legal in hotel)
U.S. v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983)(finding entry into home legal
but not into hotel room)
McKinnon v. Carr, 103 E3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996)(holding arrest valid)
Scroggins v. State, 633 S.W2d 33 (Ark. 1982)(finding hotel room arrest illegal)
State v. Santiago, 619 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 1993)(finding arrest legal)
Byrd v. State, 481 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1985)(holding arrest legal)
People v. Morgan, 447 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Patton, 460 N.E.2d 851 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Shrieber, 432 N.E.2d 1316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Graves, 482 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)(holding valid arrest)
People v. Hall, 518 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Wolff, 538 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)(finding valid arrest)
Smith v. State, 531 A.2d 302 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)(finding arrest illegal)
State v. Patricelli, 324 N.W2d 351 (Minn. 1982)(finding no warrant required)
State v. Howard, 373 N.W2d 596 (Minn. 1985)(finding arrest legal)
State v. George, 317 N.W2d 76 (Neb. 1982)(finding arrest illegal)
State v. Morse, 480 A.2d 183 (N.H. 1984)(finding arrest illegal in hotel room)
Edwards v. State, 808 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1991)(holding search illegal)
People v. Nonni, 530 N.YS.2d 205 (App. Div. 1988)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Anderson, 536 N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div. 1989)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Rosario, 579 N.YS.2d 12 (App. Div. 1992)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Francis, 619 N.YS.2d 71 (App. Div. 1994)(finding valid arrest)
People v. Min Chul Shin, 607 N.Y.S.2d 369 (App. Div. 1994)
(holding valid arrest)
People v. Schiavo and B & S Salvage, 623 N.Y. S.2d 273 (App. Div. 1995)
(finding valid arrest)
State v. Clark, 844 S.W2d 597 (Tenn. 1992)(finding search illegal)
State v. Holeman, 693 P2d 89 (Wash. 1985)(finding arrest illegal)
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